{"id":243,"date":"2026-11-15T02:40:55","date_gmt":"2026-11-15T02:40:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bayrisk.com.au\/blog\/?p=243"},"modified":"2026-11-15T02:40:55","modified_gmt":"2026-11-15T02:40:55","slug":"that-was-the-week-that-was-a-concentration-warning-on-thursday-a-24-hour-outage-on-friday","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bayrisk.com.au\/blog\/2026\/11\/15\/that-was-the-week-that-was-a-concentration-warning-on-thursday-a-24-hour-outage-on-friday\/","title":{"rendered":"That was the week that was: a concentration warning on Thursday, a 24-hour outage on Friday"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">TWTWTW &#8211; a 1960s comedy show in the UK (some of us are old enough to remember it).  Last week was anything BUT funny!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At about quarter past three on Friday morning, an Australian working week started failing in a way almost nobody had a plan for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not a breach. Not an attack. One offshore provider&#8217;s infrastructure stopped responding, and with it went email, calendars, chat, document storage, the security product and the compliance product, for a very large share of the Australian economy at once. It lasted roughly twenty-four hours. The federal police were affected. So was the domestic intelligence agency. Courts in three states reported problems and one online bail court had hearings delayed. A territory health service lost email, voicemail and some faxes. Some service centres closed their doors. [1][4]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The provider said there was no indication of malicious activity, and that the cause was an issue introduced during an earlier network capacity upgrade. The Home Affairs minister said the company did not believe it was dealing with a cyber event. So this is not a security story, and that is precisely what makes it worth reading. [1][4]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because the day before, the prudential regulator had published a paper describing the exact shape of what happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Thursday, then Friday<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On Thursday 12 November, APRA published its System Risk Outlook. It is a system-level paper about the risks facing banks, insurers and superannuation funds, and buried in it is the most useful set of third-party numbers any Australian regulator has published. [2][3]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of the top 100 service providers reported by APRA-regulated institutions, ranked by the share of regulated assets they support, <strong>80 are headquartered or have their principal operations outside Australia.<\/strong> APRA goes further. It says some individual providers support institutions that between them account for more than half of all APRA-regulated financial assets, which it calls \u201cpotentially significant concentration\u201d. [2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On Friday 13 November, one offshore provider went down and took two national security agencies&#8217; email with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Let&#8217;s be careful here, because the easy version of this is wrong. These two things are not connected. Nobody at APRA knew. There is no warning in that paper about a particular provider or a particular Friday, and anyone claiming to have called this is selling something. What happened is duller and more useful: a regulator described a structural feature of the Australian economy on Thursday, and on Friday that structural feature did the thing it was described as being able to do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Twenty-six hours apart, from two directions, with nothing in common except the thing they both describe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What APRA actually put on the page<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It&#8217;s worth staying with the paper, because the numbers are better than the headline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Among significant institutions, the typical bank identified <strong>52 material service providers.<\/strong> The typical insurer 28. The typical superannuation fund 23. Those are medians. [2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fifty-two is a manageable number. That&#8217;s the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A register of fifty-two entries looks finished. You can read it in a meeting. You can put it in a board pack. And APRA names, in its own words, the two things that register is still missing: further work is needed on each provider&#8217;s <strong>systemic importance<\/strong> and <strong>substitutability.<\/strong> [2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Look at your own register and ask which column holds either of those. Not who the provider is, you have that. Not what they do, you have that too. But whether anyone else could do it, and what happens across your sector if they stop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Friday supplied the test case, and it exposed something more awkward than a missing column. One provider, offshore, supplying email, collaboration, document storage, endpoint security and compliance tooling. On most registers that provider appears several times over, because it was bought as several products, by several teams, on several contracts. On Friday it was one failure. The register&#8217;s own structure hid the dependency, because registers are organised the way things are procured and failures are organised the way things are built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u201cDiversify\u201d is the answer that sounds right and isn&#8217;t<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here is where most of what gets written this week will go wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The obvious lesson is don&#8217;t put everything with one supplier. It&#8217;s a satisfying thing to say and almost nobody can act on it. The Commonwealth&#8217;s own national security head said as much back in August. He warned on a podcast that an outage at this provider could have a \u201cdisproportionate impact\u201d on Australia, said big technology providers \u201cunderpin our national security\u201d, and then called it <strong>unrealistic<\/strong> for Australia to find alternatives to the major United States providers. His argument was for closer ties, not fewer. [5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And the government had already tested that question properly. An independent review commissioned in February assessed single-seller arrangements, rated the vulnerability as rare but potentially catastrophic, gave it an overall risk rating of medium, cited the cost and complexity of switching as the reason these arrangements exist, and <strong>recommended keeping them.<\/strong> [5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So before Friday, the Commonwealth had named the risk, rated it, written a review about it, signed an agreement covering it, and run a resilience exercise against it the week before it happened. [5][6]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It still lost a working day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If eighteen months of focused government attention to this precise risk didn&#8217;t prevent it, a slide in your board pack saying \u201creduce single-vendor dependency\u201d isn&#8217;t going to either. Which leaves the harder question. If you can&#8217;t avoid the dependency, what can you actually buy?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The only thing preparation bought was a clause<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One thing. That&#8217;s the answer, and it&#8217;s the whole piece.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In June, Home Affairs signed a Digital Resilience Agreement with the provider. It&#8217;s a memorandum of understanding, and the department describes these as outlining areas of collaboration that support secure and reliable digital infrastructure, across cloud services, data, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. Inside it sits a pledge to <strong>prioritise recovery from major outages<\/strong> involving that provider. [5][6]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On Friday morning, the minister activated it. [1][5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That&#8217;s it. That&#8217;s the measurable return on being the most prepared customer in the country for this exact event. Not avoidance. Not continuity. Not a fallback that kept the lights on. A place nearer the front of the queue, agreed in writing, in advance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Your tolerance statement says four hours. The provider&#8217;s status page says they&#8217;re working on it. Between those two sentences there is either a negotiated recovery priority, or there is nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And if it&#8217;s nothing, then your tolerance statement isn&#8217;t a commitment anybody owes you. It&#8217;s a description of what you&#8217;d like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the bit that should sting slightly, because most of us have written one. A tolerance statement is a number arrived at internally, by people reasoning about their own business, and it&#8217;s genuinely useful for that: it tells you what matters and in what order. What it does not do, on its own, is bind anyone outside your building. Your provider has not seen it. Your provider has thousands of customers who have each written their own, and on Friday every one of those numbers was a wish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Commonwealth is the only Australian customer that found out this week which of those two things it had. Everybody else is still guessing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">So the register question changes shape<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Friday also changes what you should want the register to tell you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not \u201cwho are our material service providers\u201d, which you&#8217;ve done. But, for each one: if this stopped tomorrow, what breaks, and is there another way to do it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Three practical consequences follow, and none of them needs a new framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The provider count isn&#8217;t the exposure.<\/strong> Fifty-two entries might be twenty actual organisations. Collapse your register by legal entity and by platform, not by contract, and the concentration appears. That exercise takes an afternoon and most people have never done it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cBest efforts\u201d is a finding, not a clause.<\/strong> Read what your top five agreements actually say about notification and restoration priority. Not so you can negotiate a better one, because you won&#8217;t get it. Read it to confirm what you already suspect, which is that nothing in those documents is coming to rescue your Friday. That&#8217;s a finding, it takes an hour, and it&#8217;s what sends you to the only answer that&#8217;s actually yours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Someone has to own what happens on the day.<\/strong> Not the contract, not the vendor relationship. On Friday the organisations that coped were the ones where somebody had already decided what they&#8217;d do without email for a day, and had told people. The ones that didn&#8217;t cope spent the morning discovering it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Picture the desks, because this is where it lands. A treasury analyst at a mid-sized bank who can&#8217;t send a confirmation and can&#8217;t reach the counterparty who&#8217;s expecting it. A conveyancer with a settlement due that afternoon and a client file sitting in a mailbox. A control room operator who still has telemetry, because the plant is fine, but has lost the roster, the escalation list and the phone tree, all of which live in the same suite that just stopped. None of those three has a security problem. All three have a dependency problem, and only one of them is in anyone&#8217;s register.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The rest of the week, briefly<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It wasn&#8217;t only those two things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The regulators have been saying this in chorus and almost nobody noticed.<\/strong> Back on 27 August, APRA and ASIC jointly published findings from nine industry roundtables, more than 600 attendees from over 380 organisations, supported by the Australian Signals Directorate. One of the five themes was concentration risk, in terms: dependence on common third-party providers can turn an isolated incident into sector-wide disruption. They published a board and executive preparedness checklist with it, which is free and which we&#8217;d bet almost nobody reading this has seen. Then in September the Council of Financial Regulators described critical third parties to the financial sector as a key systemic vulnerability and discussed closing gaps in oversight of them. Then APRA&#8217;s paper on Thursday. Then Friday. [8][9]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Four dated steps, three regulators, one point, and it arrived in the order you&#8217;d want if you were trying to be fair to everybody involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>APRA also said where it&#8217;s taking this.<\/strong> Information collected under CPS 230 is improving its visibility of material service providers, and the collection is <strong>expected to be formalised<\/strong> so APRA gets a fuller system-wide view. No date has been announced, so that&#8217;s a direction rather than a deadline. But the direction is clear enough: the register you file is becoming data somebody aggregates. It&#8217;s worth it being right. [2][12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>And it flagged what it&#8217;s testing next.<\/strong> The 2027 System Stress Test will explore how AI-driven economic disruption could affect banks, superannuation funds and life insurers. The paper also notes ASD&#8217;s recommended timeline for moving to post-quantum cryptography, being a refined transition plan by the end of 2026, implementation for critical systems by the end of 2028, and completion by the end of 2030. Those are cryptography dates and nothing else. There are now three separate sets of 2027 and 2028 dates circulating in this market and merging any two of them is an error your technical people will catch instantly. [2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>A critical flaw landed on a management plane.<\/strong> On 10 November a network vendor published its November advisories, including a critical flaw letting an unauthenticated attacker make a firewall broadcast false routing announcements, and a critical unauthenticated remote code execution flaw on the channel between firewalls and their central manager. As reported, two of the affected branches have no fix available. [10]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Think about what that means rather than reaching for the patch schedule. A critical, unauthenticated flaw on a management plane with nowhere to patch to isn&#8217;t a patching problem. It&#8217;s a lifecycle problem, and it&#8217;s the third week running we&#8217;ve seen the same shape: before this it was an authentication bypass living mostly inside container base images and embedded builds, and before that end-of-life network management software. Different vendors, different asset classes, one problem. None of them appears on the kind of register a patching policy is written against, and for some of them patching isn&#8217;t an available answer at all. A patch-compliance metric computed over the assets you know about isn&#8217;t a measurement. It&#8217;s a tautology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>And one item that matters if you&#8217;re a professional services firm.<\/strong> A public leak-site tracker added an Australian accounting and bookkeeping practice in the week. A leak-site listing is a criminal group&#8217;s claim, not a confirmed breach, and we won&#8217;t name the practice or link to the page that does. It&#8217;s worth a line anyway, because it&#8217;s the first Australian accounting firm we&#8217;ve seen listed since the AML obligations landed on the professions. A small practice now holds client identity documents, beneficial ownership evidence and a written program describing how it decides what&#8217;s suspicious. That&#8217;s a more attractive file than it was eighteen months ago, and the firms holding it are the ones least likely to have a recovery position with anybody. [13]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>On the AI announcement from the week before.<\/strong> The rapid review&#8217;s recommendations were released by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on 10 November. There were eighteen and the government accepted all of them. They ask government to consider mandatory, time-bound reporting of AI safety incidents, including misaligned model behaviour and cyber incidents involving autonomous agents. No timeframe is specified anywhere, and anyone quoting you an hour count is making it up. The obligations in view land on the developer, not on you. Which, as we wrote at the time, makes it a supply-chain question rather than an AI question: your model vendor may acquire a duty to tell a regulator quickly, and nothing announced says it owes you the same call. [11]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Where BayRisk lands on this<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two readings of Friday are already circulating and we think both are comfortable in a way that won&#8217;t help you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first is that this proves cloud concentration is dangerous and we should all diversify. The government tested that and said no, on cost and complexity grounds, in a review it commissioned itself. If the Commonwealth can&#8217;t unpick it, a mid-sized insurer isn&#8217;t going to. Treating \u201cdiversify\u201d as the lesson means walking away with an action nobody will fund. [5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second is that it was somebody else&#8217;s outage and there was nothing to be done. That&#8217;s closer to true, and it&#8217;s still not a position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And the clause, honestly, isn&#8217;t available to you either. A prioritised recovery pledge is what a sovereign government with more than a billion dollars of contracts can negotiate. You&#8217;re not getting one. [5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It&#8217;s also worth being honest about what the clause bought, because it can&#8217;t have been much. The Commonwealth had the best contractual position of any customer in the country, activated it on the morning, and still lost the working day along with everybody else. <strong>A priority pledge moves you up a queue. It doesn&#8217;t fix the thing at the front of it.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So here&#8217;s where we land.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You can&#8217;t remove the dependency. You can make sure your crown jewels have another way to run.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not everything, and that&#8217;s the bit that makes this feel possible rather than hopeless. You have three or four business processes that genuinely can&#8217;t stop for a day without costing you money, customers or a licence condition. Settling funds. Paying people. Dispatching crews. Taking a claim. Everything else can wait until Monday, and on Friday most of it did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So name those three or four. Then ask one question of each. <strong>If the primary suite is gone for a day, is there any path that still gets it done?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Slower is fine. Manual is fine. A spreadsheet, a printed call list and somebody&#8217;s mobile is fine, as long as it&#8217;s been thought about once before the day it&#8217;s needed. What isn&#8217;t fine is no path at all, which is quietly where most organisations are, because nobody has ever asked the question in those terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And look at the login, not just the application. This is the one that catches people. If your second factor rides on the same platform as the thing you&#8217;re trying to reach, then on a day like Friday you don&#8217;t have two factors. You have one, and it&#8217;s gone with everything else. Any alternative path has to include a way for a real person to prove who they are when the usual way of proving it is down. If your business was still running 2FA, you had FA chance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Which is why we&#8217;d take this week and point it straight at the business continuity plan. Most BCPs are written against events: fire, flood, a site nobody can get into, a datacentre that&#8217;s gone. Very few are written against what actually happened on Friday, which is that everything was fine except you couldn&#8217;t reach it. The plant ran. The data was safe. Nothing was lost. People just couldn&#8217;t work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So read the BCP against your crown jewels rather than against a list of disasters. For each one: who does it, what do they need, and what&#8217;s the degraded version. Then write the degraded version down and tell the people who&#8217;d have to run it, because a fallback nobody has been told about isn&#8217;t a fallback. That&#8217;s an afternoon, it costs nothing, and it&#8217;s the only thing on this page you can do without anyone else&#8217;s permission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And we&#8217;d say one more thing in fairness to the people who had a bad Friday. Almost every organisation affected was doing what it was told to do. Consolidating onto a single suite is the recommended path. It&#8217;s cheaper, it&#8217;s more secure in most respects, and it&#8217;s what every review of a fragmented estate concludes. Nobody who ended up concentrated did so carelessly. The gap isn&#8217;t the consolidation. It&#8217;s that the manual fallback quietly got decommissioned along the way, and nobody wrote down what replaced it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The regulator&#8217;s own framing is better than ours. APRA&#8217;s chair said Australia&#8217;s financial system remains resilient, but that the risk environment is becoming \u201cless forgiving\u201d, and that institutions and regulators need practical capabilities to manage crises that combine financial and operational pressures. Practical capabilities. Not more policy. [3]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Three questions worth answering before the next one<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Friday&#8217;s provider will have another bad day eventually, and so will one of the other seventy-nine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1. Collapse your register by organisation, not by contract.<\/strong> How many of your material service providers are actually the same company? Did you learn that from your register, or from the news?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2. Name your crown jewels, then find the degraded path for each.<\/strong> Three or four processes that can&#8217;t stop for a day. For each one: what&#8217;s the slower, manual, uglier version that still gets it done, and has anybody ever actually run it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3. Put a name against that path, and tell the people who&#8217;d have to run it.<\/strong> Not the contract owner, not the vendor manager. The person who decides what the business does on a day like Friday, and whose job it was to have told everyone else beforehand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">None of that requires a framework, a tool or a consultant. It requires an afternoon and somebody&#8217;s name against it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If it&#8217;s useful, we&#8217;re happy to talk through which of your processes genuinely can&#8217;t stop, and what a workable fallback looks like for each one when you can&#8217;t change the provider: hello@bayrisk.com.au.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"\">ABC News, \u201cMicrosoft outage hits users worldwide, affecting Teams, Outlook and Copilot, as it happened\u201d, 13 November 2026. https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-11-13\/microsoft-outage-affects-users-worldwide\/107381050<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, \u201cAPRA&#8217;s System Risk Outlook, November 2026\u201d, information paper, 12 November 2026. https:\/\/www.apra.gov.au\/news-and-publications\/apras-system-risk-outlook-november-2026<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">APRA, \u201cAPRA&#8217;s latest System Risk Outlook warns of rising threats to financial stability\u201d, media release, 12 November 2026. https:\/\/www.apra.gov.au\/news-and-publications\/apras-latest-system-risk-outlook-warns-rising-threats-financial-stability<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">PBS NewsHour, \u201cMicrosoft says services fully restored after global outage\u201d, 14 November 2026. https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/newshour\/world\/microsoft-says-services-fully-restored-after-global-outage<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">ABC News, \u201cTop national security adviser warned about Australia&#8217;s Microsoft reliance months ago\u201d, 13 November 2026. https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-11-13\/microsoft-reliance-national-security-risk\/107382100<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Department of Home Affairs, \u201cDigital Resilience Agreements\u201d. https:\/\/www.homeaffairs.gov.au\/about-us\/our-portfolios\/cyber-security\/digital-resilience-agreements<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, October 2026, Focus Topic 4.1, \u201cOperational Risk and Financial Stability\u201d, 1 October 2026. https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/publications\/fsr\/2026\/oct\/focus-topic-operational-risk-and-financial-stability.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">ASIC, \u201c26-201MR ASIC and APRA warn frontier AI awareness must turn to action\u201d, 27 August 2026. https:\/\/www.asic.gov.au\/about-asic\/news-centre\/find-a-media-release\/2026-releases\/26-201mr-asic-and-apra-warn-frontier-ai-awareness-must-turn-to-action\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Council of Financial Regulators, media release 2026-05, 3 September 2026. https:\/\/cfr.gov.au\/news\/2026\/mr-26-05.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Fortinet, FortiGuard PSIRT advisories, November 2026 batch published 10 November 2026, advisories FG-IR-26-267, FG-IR-26-275, FG-IR-26-244 and FG-IR-26-229. https:\/\/www.fortiguard.com\/psirt<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Australian Cyber Security Magazine, \u201cAustralia moves to tighten AI safety laws after review of OpenAI incident\u201d, November 2026. https:\/\/australiancybersecuritymagazine.com.au\/australia-moves-to-tighten-ai-safety-laws-after-review-of-openai-incident\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">APRA, Prudential Standard CPS 230 Operational Risk Management, in force 1 July 2025, targeted amendments effective 1 July 2026. https:\/\/www.apra.gov.au\/standards\/cps-230<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"\">Public ransomware leak-site tracker, Australian view, read 15 November 2026. Citation generalised, as the tracker page names claimed victim organisations.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>TWTWTW &#8211; a 1960s comedy show in the UK (some of us are old enough to remember it). Last week was anything BUT funny! 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