There’s a person in a lot of Australian organisations who quietly holds three things together.
- The risk and compliance position, which lives in a spreadsheet. One person understands it properly, and it gets brought up to date when something forces the issue.
- Third party assurance, which is a questionnaire. It goes out, some of them come back, and they go in a folder.
- People risk, which is awareness training everybody takes once a year, reported as a completion rate.
It’s usually the same person for all three, doing it alongside two or three other roles. Often nobody outside the function realises it’s one person.
If that’s you, or if that person works for you, this is about what those three things can and can’t tell you, and what tends to happen next when somebody goes looking for something better.
None of it is a failure. It’s what fits in the time.
This needs saying before anything else, because the market usually opens by saying the opposite.
A spreadsheet is the rational output of somebody with four hours a month for this. It’s quick, it’s free, it’s entirely under their control, and it’s exactly what a sensible person builds when the alternative is nothing. The same goes for the questionnaire and the annual awareness training. Each one is a reasonable answer to a real obligation, chosen by somebody who had to choose something and then get on with the rest of their job.
So this isn’t an article about doing it wrong. Nobody did it wrong.
A spreadsheet is what a sensible person builds when the alternative is nothing.
What each of the three can actually tell you
Take them one at a time, because each one does something useful and each one stops at the same place.
The spreadsheet records what somebody believed on the day they typed it. That’s a genuine thing to have, and it’s more than many organisations hold. What it can’t do is say whether a control is operating today. A row stating that a control is in place is a statement about an intention, not evidence of an outcome. And because it gets maintained in the run-up to something rather than continuously, the moment it’s most out of date is usually the moment before somebody decides to look at it.
The returned questionnaire tells you it was returned. It’s the supplier’s account of the supplier, written by the supplier, and nothing in the process tests it. The harder part is what happens after a thin answer comes back. Somebody has to read it, notice it’s thin, decide it matters enough to be awkward about, and then go back to a supplier who is busy. That’s an hour nobody had, so mostly it doesn’t happen. Which means the file is full and the question is still open.
The annual awareness training reports who clicked through it. That’s a compliance record and it has its uses. What it isn’t is a picture of where people risk sits, because risk doesn’t sit evenly across a workforce. It concentrates. It collects around a handful of people who hold the access that matters, and it’s a correlation rather than a number: what someone can reach, whether their role was ever genuinely enabled for it, and whether their credentials are sitting somewhere they shouldn’t because of a service that has nothing to do with work. Blanket awareness training gives everyone the same twenty minutes and says nothing about which of them is the one that matters.
Put the three together and the pattern repeats. Each one produces a record. None of them produces a position.
Which is the point at which somebody goes looking for something better. And the market is ready.
A platform arrives as a licence and a login
There’s a platform for each of those three. A GRC platform to replace the spreadsheet. A third party risk tool to run the questionnaires. An awareness platform to run the training and the simulations. All three are real products, most of them are good, and every one of them demonstrates beautifully.
And here’s the mechanism nobody mentions in the demo.
A platform arrives as a licence and a login.
What it hands you is the ability to do the work. It does not hand you the work done.
Configuration, tuning, chasing the control owners, reading what comes back, deciding what to act on and keeping the evidence of why: all of it lands on exactly the desk it landed on before. The difference is that there’s now a console in front of it, and somebody has to run it.
The licence was in the business case. The running of it wasn’t.
If you re-read that, the whole thing turns on one word. Ability. A platform sells you the ability to do the work, and the ability was never what was missing. The person running the spreadsheet already knew what good looked like. What they didn’t have was the hours, and a licence does not come with hours attached.
So look at what the trade actually is. Three things that take too long and tell you less than you’d like become three things that take too long, tell you more if somebody has time to interpret them, and three systems to administer on top. The spreadsheet took ten minutes a fortnight and nobody needed training on it. The platform takes a quarter to implement and then needs somebody forever.
This is measurable, and it happened to the organisations that did buy
None of this has to be taken on argument. The organisations that went down that road have been surveyed.
A global study of more than 2,300 security decision-makers found organisations running an average of 29 security monitoring tools, rising to 46 in enterprises above 10,000 staff. [1]
The number that matters more is the next one. 51 per cent had stopped using tools they had already bought. The reasons given were lack of integration, no skilled people to run them, and not being able to work out how to operationalise them at all. [1]
That is the licence and the login, measured. The products worked. The logins worked. Half the stack was bought and then defeated because nobody had the hours to run it.
It was never a spreadsheet problem. It was a capacity problem, and the spreadsheet was the symptom.
And a tool nobody runs isn’t a neutral asset sitting in reserve for a better year. Every un-tuned alert feed and unread dashboard is noise, and noise lengthens the window an attacker works in unseen. [2]
The obligations are not going to slow down to let anyone catch up
None of this is happening in a quiet year.
New obligations now land on something close to a quarterly cadence. Each is perfectly reasonable taken on its own. Together they assume something nobody ever wrote down, which is a standing capability to turn law into a defensible, evidenced position, continuously, rather than once a year in the fortnight before somebody asks.
And the people who would run that capability aren’t available in the numbers required. Australia has faced a forecast shortfall of up to 30,000 cyber security professionals, and it bites hardest on organisations that can’t outbid a bank for the handful of senior operators actually on the market. [3]
So the obligations arrive, the headcount doesn’t, and into that gap steps a vendor with a platform that promises to close it. Which is one more console, and one more thing to run.
And then there’s the desk it all lands on
Everything above lands on one desk. It’s worth being specific about whose, because this part doesn’t appear on any budget line and it’s the one that compounds.
The person running the spreadsheet, the questionnaires and the awareness training is successfully handling nearly everything that comes at the organisation, week after week. Nobody tells them so, because nothing happening is invisible. The one thing that gets through is the only one anybody remembers. They’re doing it on resources that weren’t enough two years ago, against obligations that have multiplied since.
People don’t last long in that, and the good ones have options. When they go, the context goes with them: what was assessed, what was accepted and by whom, where the evidence actually lives. Most of it was only ever in one person’s head, and the spreadsheet was never the real record. They were.
We’ve written about that loop more than once. The design fault in the role. The burnout nobody reports. The weight the job was never meant to carry.
Where BayRisk lands on this
So here’s the position, stated plainly.
A platform on its own is the wrong purchase for a team with no hours spare. Not because it’s a bad product, but because of what it can’t achieve.
It gives you the licence and the login. That’s the tooling, and the tooling is real and worth having. What it doesn’t give you is the running of it, which is the configuration, the chasing, the evidence gathering and the keeping it current. And it doesn’t give you somebody senior enough to read what that produces and turn it into something a board can act on.
Buy the Risk operation instead, run for you, and it carries all three.
The tooling, licensed in your name rather than ours. The administrative work, done by people whose actual job that is, so the platform produces its best rather than its minimum. And senior CISO capacity in the loop, interpreting the output and translating it into investable insights.
A finding nobody can turn into a business case doesn’t get fixed. It gets carried.
Those last two are different jobs, and the difference is where this usually goes wrong.
Gathering the evidence is administrative. Chasing the control owners, collecting what comes back, tuning the thing, keeping it current. It takes hands and persistence rather than seniority, and there’s a great deal of it.
Interpreting it isn’t administrative at all. Deciding which finding actually matters to this business, what it would cost to put right, and how to say that to a board in terms they’ll fund, is senior judgement and it doesn’t delegate downwards.
Ask one person for both and you lose the second every time. Hire junior and the evidence is tidy and nobody can translate it. Hire senior and they spend the week chasing, which is exactly where the hours went before the platform arrived.
The risk itself doesn’t move. It belongs to the board and the executive, by law and by governance, and it can’t be outsourced to anyone, including us. What changes is who runs it underneath them, and whether the people carrying the risk are being handed something they can actually fund.
And it covers the whole of it as one operation rather than three separate jobs. The risk and compliance position, evidenced rather than asserted. The suppliers the organisation depends on, assessed on evidence and sized to what they actually do. And where people risk genuinely sits, role by role, instead of a completion rate.
The risk stays yours. The operation becomes ours.
If any of that sounds like your week, or like somebody’s week in your organisation, we’re happy to talk it through, whether or not it goes anywhere: hello@bayrisk.com.au.
References
- 1. Trend Micro, global security operations survey of 2,303 security decision-makers across 21 countries.
- 2. Independent breach detection and containment research, as cited in BayRisk, “The tool becomes the job”, August 2026.
- 3. CyberCX and Per Capita, Australian cyber workforce report, forecast shortfall of up to 30,000 professionals.